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Abstract—Business-to-Business (B2B) interactions can be
defined in terms of the exchange of documents. Such exchanges
must be regulated to comply with obligations including service
agreements, contracts and law. It is fundamental to such
regulation that participants are held accountable for their
actions. This can be achieved through the deployment of
support services to produce a verifiable audit trail of inter-
actions. Typically these support services have been designed to
be deployed in-house, placing requirements on infrastructure
and technical ability. Cloud and utility computing allow this
support to be delivered as a cloud hosted service by a specialist
security provider, alleviating the aforementioned concerns for
businesses. This paper analyses various possibilities for lever-
aging the cloud in this way and reports on the design and
implementation of a document exchange service constructed
using cloud-based infrastructure.
Keywords-cloud computing; service oriented computing;
business-to-business; accountability; non-repudiation;
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity of services and resources available across
the Web presents increasing opportunities for business-
to-business (B2B) collaboration between organisations to
achieve mutually beneficial goals. These collaborations are
conducted in the form of exchanges of business documents.
Participants in such collaborations maintain their autonomy
except with respect to their agreed undertakings but will
typically privilege their own interests above those of their
partners. This preference can lead to a tension with the desire
to cooperate. Recent studies show a rise in both network-
based collaboration (or “the extended enterprise”) and the
inherent risks arising from increased collaboration [1]. The
study shows that data breaches involving business partners
had risen from 8% in 2004 to 32% in 2008, peaking at 44%
in 2007.
To mitigate risks associated with collaboration, there is
a need for monitoring and control of B2B interactions,
allowing behaviour to be regulated to ensure compliance
with agreements such as service contracts and process spec-
ifications.
An important aspect of monitoring and control is ac-
countability. Partners must be held accountable for their
actions and all actions taken must be acknowledged. To this
end, business partners agree to the generation of an audit
trail that provides evidence for accountability. Without this
unambiguous evidence agreements can be unenforceable and
subsequent dispute resolution made difficult. For example, it
should not be possible to subsequently deny having received
or transmitted some business document in the context of a
regulated partnership [2].
Generation of an audit trail can be achieved by deploying
support services at the middleware level, these support ser-
vices operate as lower level mechanisms in B2B interactions,
functioning to assist in realising higher level views of B2B
collaborations, such as those described in [3]. By deploying
such support at the middleware level, businesses are freed
from underlying technical concerns, allowing them to focus
on meeting business objectives.
Support services fulfilling this functionality have been
discussed in previous work [4], [5], however these services
were designed to be hosted inside an organisation wishing
to conduct fair exchanges with other parties. This placed
requirements on expertise and infrastructure that many small
to medium enterprises are unable to satisfy. Cloud and utility
computing have the potential to allow such capabilities to
be deployed as services in the cloud. This allows expertise
requirements to be shifted to a security service provider that
uses the cloud to address infrastructure requirements.
This paper describes the design and implementation of
a cloud-based centralised business document exchange ser-
vice. Section II will discuss the motivation for regulated
exchange. Section III will introduce fair and non-repudiable
document exchange. Section IV will discuss motivation and
assumptions of operating the service in the cloud. Section V
will explore design possibilities and implications for the
cloud-based accountability service. Section VI will describe
the design and construction of the centralised document
exchange service and its use. Section VII will report on
related work. Section VIII will discuss conclusions and
future work.
II. MOTIVATION FOR REGULATED EXCHANGE
This section will motivate the need for fair exchange of
business documents between partners for regulation. Busi-
nesses interact by exchanging business documents to achieve
mutually beneficial goals. These documents typically include
A B
1. Order
2. Ack
3. Invoice
4. Ack
(a) Multiple messages comprise a business conversa-
tion.
A B
Exchange 1
Exchange 2
(b) The same conversation can be broken down into
constituent exchanges.
Figure 1. A business conversation shown fully and broken down into a
sequence of exchanges.
purchase orders, requests to tender or contracts such as non-
disclosure agreements. They may have intrinsic value or be
critical to the success a partnership.
Document based exchanges, naturally modelling these real
world B2B interactions, have led to the development of
open standards such as ebXML [6] and RosettaNet Partner
Interface Process [7] that specify business conversations.
These conversations detail the structure, ordering and basic
requirements (e.g. deadlines, acknowledgements and reliable
delivery) of the messages to be exchanged to successfully
achieve some business objective. The payload of these
messages are the business documents and acknowledgements
being exchanged.
Figure 1 (a) shows an example conversation including the
delivery of an order and the production of a corresponding
invoice, both with acknowledgements. Information such as
deadlines for transmission and processing are omitted for
brevity.
While these conversations may involve many steps, they
can be broken down into correlated sequences of single
exchanges, each with optional acknowledgement as shown
in Figure 1 (b). Conversation identifiers within each message
allow correlation of exchanges.
The regulatory challenge is to ensure both participants
comply with the required behaviour. Specifically, assurance
is needed that for all single document exchanges from A to
B:
1) There is irrefutable evidence the document originated
with A.
2) There is irrefutable evidence the same document was
received by B.
3) Neither A or B obtains documents or evidence pre-
A TTP
1. Doc,
NRO
5. NRR
B
2. h(NRO)
3. NRR
4. Doc,
NRO
Figure 2. Non-repudiable Document Exchange.
maturely.
Points 1 and 2 in the above list can be addressed by
non-repudiation, the property that no participant can sub-
sequently deny their participation in an activity [8]. Point
3 is addressed by fairness, informally defined as ensuring
that no well behaved party is placed at a disadvantage
through the misbehaviour of another [9]. Failing to address
these points can place participants at a disadvantage despite
correct behaviour. In contrast, the outcome of a fair, non-
repudiable exchange is that all parties obtain the evidence
and documents to which they are entitled, or the ability to
acquire them, or that none do.
Non-repudiation is recognised as an important property of
standardised business conversations. Current standards allow
conversations to be specified as requiring non-repudiation
but do not prescribe the mechanisms by which this must be
achieved, or whether it must be done fairly.
III. NON-REPUDIABLE DOCUMENT EXCHANGE
The previous section shows accountability is essential for
regulating B2B interactions and introduced the notions of
non-repudiation and fairness. Previous work demonstrates
deterministic fair exchange requires a trusted third party
(TTP) [10]. The assumption adopted for this paper is that
participants trust their exchange service but not necessarily
each other. Thus, non-repudiable document exchange is the
fair exchange of a document and irrefutable evidence of its
origin for irrefutable evidence of its receipt, aided by a TTP
(i.e. the exchange service) as shown in Figure 2.
The document exchange illustrated in Figure 2 is derived
from the Coffey-Saidha non-repudiation protocol that uses
an in-line TTP for communication [11]. Communication
channels between A and the TTP , and between B and the
TTP , are encrypted.
The NRO token shown in the figure represents Non-
repudiation of Origin, specifically A’s digital signature over
Doc. The NRR token refers to Non-repudiation of Receipt
and is B’s signature over the NRO evidence, creating a cryp-
tographically bound chain of evidence from Doc through
its submission by A and its retrieval by B. Specifically
for Coffey-Saidha non-repudiation, NRR is generated by
B signing a digest of NRO , to prevent B prematurely
obtaining NRO .
Execution of steps 1 through 5 as shown in Figure 2 repre-
sent one complete execution of the Coffey-Saidha protocol.
For the case of document exchange this can be broken down
into three phases.
Step 1 constitutes the submission phase, in which A
submits both Doc and NRO to the TTP. Steps 2 through
4 constitute the retrieval phase in which B receives a digest
of A’s NRO evidence, digitally signs it (generating the NRR
evidence) and submits it to the TTP, subsequently gaining
access to Doc and the original NRO . Step 5 is the final
evidence retrieval phase in which the NRR evidence is made
available to A for collection. The phases must be executed
in the correct order to maintain fairness.
For brevity, full non-repudiation protocol details have
been omitted including required cryptographic information,
protocol run identifiers and trusted timestamps, see [4] for
detailed discussion on the topic.
The protocol provides deterministic fairness by using the
TTP in every step of an exchange between two participants
(inline). Other approaches relax TTP involvement by using
it only for initiation and guaranteed termination (online)
or by using it only for guaranteed termination (offline).
Zhou [12] and Kremer et al [8] provide surveys of the var-
ious approaches and their properties. The exchange service
described in this paper will act as a TTP to support non-
repudiation protocol execution on behalf of its customers.
Previously, participants such as those in Figure 2 are
required to understand the lower level non-repudiation pro-
tocols and their associated evidence to be able to partake
in an exchange. A motivation for providing accountability
as a service is that the participants can be freed from many
underlying technicalities to focus on business objectives.
The exchange service described in this paper renders ac-
countable document exchange as an explicit service. Future
work could provide accountability as a satisfiable property
of message delivery middleware, further shielding the par-
ticipants from underlying details. This will be discussed in
section VIII-A.
IV. MOTIVATION AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR
CLOUD-BASED OPERATION
Section I introduced previous work that focussed on host-
ing support services for accountability within the individual
entities wishing to engage in non-repudiable exchange of
messages or documents [4], [5]. Hosting these services
within a business requires both infrastructure to execute
the services and technical knowledge to configure them
correctly.
In discussing the motivation for designing and operating
the service in the cloud, two target groups are discussed.
The first group is that of the security service provider.
The security service provider has the technical knowledge
to design and operate an accountable exchange service,
including understanding the related socio-legal implications.
However, they do not not necessarily have the required
infrastructure to support it.
A
CDES
BStore
TSA ...
...
Figure 3. Exchange through a centralised service.
The second group is the service consumer, presumably
characterised by small to medium enterprises (SMEs) but
more broadly described as any business wishing to engage
in accountable exchange of documents but without the
technical know-how or the infrastructure to provide the
required support services themselves.
By operating the service in the cloud the service provider
is allowed to capitalise on their expert knowledge, spending
only what is required on the cloud provider for the resources
consumed. The service consumer is able to engage in
accountable exchange by simply consuming the accountabil-
ity service, presumably paying only for their slice of the
consumed resources directly to the service provider who in
turn pays the cloud provider(s).
A secondary benefit of cloud-based operation is that
resources are assumed to be easy to acquire. This allows the
possibility for the exchange service to scale to support large
numbers of consumers, documents store and concurrent
exchanges. Details of such scaling will be discussed in
section VI.
The assumption in section III is that consumers trust the
exchange service but not necessarily each other, this leads
to the assumption that the service provider must trust the
cloud providers on which their service is executing. The
possible use of trusted computing to increase confidence in
the security guarantees of cloud providers is discussed in
section VII.
V. ACCOUNTABILITY AS A SERVICE
As previously discussed, cloud technologies can be lever-
aged to provide accountability as a service and make this
service operate at a cost of only what resources (e.g. storage,
bandwidth and computation) are consumed.
When dealing with sub B2B exchanges, companies may
trust their own decisions and processes ahead of their collab-
orators. In the case of accountability as a service this trust
extends to the business’ choice of service provider, leading
to two useful scenarios to consider in terms of document
exchange services.
Figure 3 illustrates the centralised exchange scenario,
under which a single service facilitates an entire exchange
between A and B. The service provides points of interaction
for both clients and accesses all necessary component ser-
vices to function as a TTP for the exchanges (e.g. Trusted
Timestamping Authority (TSA) and storage of documents,
evidence and logs).
A DESA B
TTP
DESB
Figure 4. Exchange through decentralised services with an external TTP.
Under the centralised exchange scenario, A and B have
to agree that the chosen exchange service meet both of
their requirements. The natural alternative is a decentralised
exchange service as shown in Figure 4.
In this case, an exchange is facilitated by separate services
acting on behalf of their respective clients. Figure 4 shows
distinct providers for each service and the TTP. While only
the TTP is shown as external to both providers here, it is
feasible other elements (e.g. storage or logging) could also
be located elsewhere.
The decentralised approach allows clients to consume
services satisfying their own specific requirements and de-
couples the choice of some components from the choice
of service provider. Figure 4 illustrates a scenario in which
participants could agree to use a specific TTP, or delegate the
decision and agreement to their respective service providers.
This decentralised approach allows flexibility but intro-
duces new complexities. Particularly, issues of inter-provider
communication. To enable multiple exchange providers to
facilitate exchanges, standards would need to be defined
specifying the structure and sequence of messages to be
exchanged. Such standards would need to be general enough
to support multiple non-repudiation protocols and deal with
agreement on which protocol to use for each exchange.
For centralised and decentralised scenarios, two ap-
proaches to service design and construction were considered.
These approaches centred on building everything using
cloud-based infrastructure as the building blocks (i.e. ‘built
using the cloud’) versus building the system off the cloud
and deploying different elements of the system into the cloud
as needed (i.e. ‘deployed on the cloud’).
These possibilities will be discussed further in this section
by considering the major aspects of the document exchange
service:
1) The processing (or computation) components of the
system
2) The communication with and within the system
3) The storage of information within the system (files,
databases and logs)
A. Built Using Cloud
This approach seeks to leverage cloud-hosted technologies
for all system aspects (computation, communication and
storage). In the case of a document exchange service this
might entail the use of databases for storage, message based
communication with queues and topics and virtual machine
deployment for computation.
An appealing aspect of leveraging cloud technologies is
the cost and speed at which resources may be acquired,
potentially quicker and cheaper than purchasing and con-
figuring hardware within an organisation. Assuming an
adequate design, the ease of acquisition of these constituent
technologies means the system can scale the necessary com-
ponents to cope with increased number of users, documents
stored and ongoing exchanges or other service requests
such as evidence retrieval. This reduced cost and increased
accessibility allows the motivations discussed in section IV
to be realised.
When choosing components that are services themselves,
there is choice with regards to using a single provider for
all aspects, or multiple distinct providers.
For providers such as Amazon, there are benefits to the
single vendor approach. For example, Amazon do not charge
for internal data that passes between their own services, they
guarantee immediate delivery of notifications from Elastic
Compute Cloud virtual machines to Simple Notification
Service (SNS) topics and they provide guaranteed delivery
of SNS notifications to Simple Queueing Service subscriber
queues. Another possible advantage to this single provider
approach is that all elements may be hosted on the same
logical network, within a firewall.
An obvious issue with choosing a single provider is that
flexibility regarding desired availability, reliability, durability
or performance is limited to only what the chosen provider
offers. By allowing diverse provider choice, providers can
be judged individually based on specific requirements in-
cluding those mentioned and other factors such as economic
concerns.
B. Deployed On Cloud
While section V-A focussed on constructing a system
from the ground up to use the cloud, this approach allows a
transition to using the cloud by taking existing systems and
deploying them on the cloud.
Business can encapsulate one more more component
services of a system and their execution environments into
virtual machines. These virtual machines could then be de-
ployed on the cloud. Deploying configured virtual machines
in this manner is a relatively simple operation, allowing a
near seamless migration, useful if the primary goal is to
migrate an existing setup in to the cloud. This could be
used to facilitate phasing out older hardware or even coping
with temporary failures. Encapsulating small elements of a
service like this allows for rapid entry into capitalising on
the cloud.
More complex possibilities for ‘on cloud’ deployment
include replacing individual aspects of the system with
cloud-hosted technologies such as those used in section V-A,
A MSA
TTP
TSA
PKI
BMSB
Figure 5. Conceptual components of previous work.
the distinction here is that at least one element of the
system remain in the control of the customer. Reasons
for maintaining this control may include an inability of
cloud providers to satisfy specific requirements or laws and
policies regarding data protection, Sion and Winslett [13]
provide a thorough overview of regulatory issues when deal-
ing with data management. Techniques such as anonymising
data with an association identifier for reintegration after
processing in the cloud can be used to deal with some of
these issues.
1) Deploying Previous Non-repudiation Work On Cloud:
Section I mentioned previous work involving the construc-
tion of support services to facilitate non-repudiable delivery
of messages, envisioned to be executed as a messaging
service (MS) within an organisation [4], [5]. Figure 5 shows
the conceptual components employed in the work (for both
Web Services (WS) and Java Messaging Service (JMS)
technologies). The messaging service components, hosted
within each organisation here were responsible for their own
storage of evidence and logging.
Cloud computing allows hosting to be outsourced and it is
possible that any of the components (MS, TTP, TSA, Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI)) here could be quickly moved
into the cloud and eventually supplanted by cloud-based
infrastructure.
C. Common Issues
There are some concerns that are common to both
approaches. When dealing with multiple providers as in
section V-A, or even multiple components as in section V-B,
the use of open standards would increase the usefulness
of a design. For example, messaging standards such as
AMQP [14] could render the messaging provider a simple
configuration detail of the exchange service, allowing the
use of both cloud and non-cloud based providers. To similar
ends, Restful State Transfer (REST) [15] could be used
for storage services, assuming well understood resource
representations.
VI. CENTRALISED EXCHANGE SERVICE
Section V introduced design possibilities for development
of an exchange service and some of their associated issues.
As a first example, this section describes the design and
construction of a centralised document exchange service as
described in section V-A and realised using Amazon Web
Services.
Interaction with the service will be discussed initially,
allowing internals of the service to be introduced and de-
scribed in detail. The interaction with the service is message
based and assumes at least once delivery for messages.
Communication will be asynchronous and facilitated in a
point-to-point manner by queues and in a publish-subscribe
manner by topics.
Two partners, A and B, exchanging documents through
the centralised document exchange service (CDES) are as-
sumed to have prior knowledge of each other (i.e. sufficient
for either to start an exchange) and to have agreed upon use
of the same provider’s CDES.
Fairness and non-repudiation are achieved by following
the phased generation, exchange and release of a document
and its associated evidence as described in section III.
A. Interaction with the Service
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate that where customers wish
to interact with their exchange service, the service must
provide some point for doing so. Communication with the
service is done using message passing. A useful first step in
defining interaction with the service is to look at the phases
specified in section III and determine suitable groupings of
operations provided by an exchange service. This led to
the specification of four areas of functionality between the
customer and the service:
1) Document Management allowing customers to up-
load their documents and associated evidence of ori-
gin.
2) Exchange Management for starting and conducting
exchanges of uploaded documents (either participant
may start an exchange if they have permission).
3) Service Notification allowing customers to be notified
of important events by the service (e.g. ‘an exchange
has been started’ or ‘an exchange has been success-
fully completed and evidence is now available’).
4) Evidence Retrieval allowing customers to retrieve
evidence (and exchanged documents) they are entitled
to.
Note the deletion or modification of existing documents
is not provided but could be supported as the a copy of the
document at the time of exchange is stored as part of the
evidence log.
These areas of functionality dictate that to interact with
the service, the client requires:
1) Outgoing Queue for messages from the customer to
the service.
2) Incoming Queue for messages from the service to the
customer.
3) Notification Topic allowing the service to notify the
customer of important events.
The use of two queues and one topic per customer fine
grained access control at the boundary of the service.
The use of messaging in this manner requires a format
for messages to be exchanged. A simple XML format
was created for this work, similar to SOAP in that it
comprises a header with arbitrary metadata and a payload
for processing. The metadata will include information about
which operation is being invoked (e.g. begin an exchange)
and the relevant data to that request (e.g. the identity of the
document to be exchange and the recipient). In the case of
uploading a document, the payload could contain a complete
RosettaNet or ebXML message, allowing compatibility with
existing standards. All messages within the system have a
unique message identifier, to handle potential for duplicate
messages as a result of at least once delivery guarantee (in
contrast to at most once and exactly once delivery offered
by messaging such as JMS).
At this point, to interact with the service the customer
must understand the messaging format used for communi-
cation. This may be acceptable for some customers, but the
message based interaction can be easily masked through a
client API. Four simple programmatic APIs were created
to do this, one for each of the previously identified areas
of functionality. These simple APIs are asynchronous and
require only business documents or evidence from the cus-
tomer, hiding the underlying message format.
B. Detailed Service Design
Section VI-A discussed interaction with the service,
Figure 6 provides a closer view of the internals of the
exchange service and details how the In and Out queues
and Event topic connect to the internal service components.
Solid interconnecting lines denote communication between
the customer and the service. Dashed interconnecting lines
denote message flow within the exchange service. Dotted
interconnecting lines show notifications from components
to the event topic. Details omitted in the figure for clarity
will be subsequently explained.
An important clarification is that the Work queue within
the service is also connected to the Out queue of B and the
Done queue is also connected to the In queue of A. That
is, all messages coming into the service are aggregated into
the Work queue and all messages leaving the service are
distributed from the Done queue. This allows the number of
message processors within the service to be scaled arbitrarily
to cope with the service workload.
A complete exchange between A and B would result in
messages and notifications passing through both In, Out and
Event destinations, and through the Work and Done queues
within the service, as shown in the example in section VI-C.
All logic within the service is written using the Scala pro-
gramming language [16], providing full compatibility with
Java and its libraries. Communication within the exchange
service (and thus the cloud-provider) is facilitated by the
A
Centralised Document Exchange Service
Document
Store TSA
Evidence
Log
API
B
API
Message Processor
Out In Event Out In Event
Q Work Q Done
Figure 6. Exchange service internal components and message flow.
Scala actors package (supporting concurrency through mes-
sage passing). Communication crossing the cloud-provider
boundary is facilitated by messaging middleware.
The following Amazon Web Services provide cloud-based
infrastructure used to construct the exchange service:
• Simple Queueing Service (SQS) for queue based
messaging between customers and the service.
• Simple Notification Service (SNS) for event notifica-
tion between customers and the service.
• SimpleDB Service (SDB) for a document database
containing customer information and for flexible con-
figuration storage for the service.
• RelationalDB Service (RDS) for hosting a MySQL da-
tabase containing exchange information (and evidence).
• Simple Storage Service (S3) to store documents up-
loaded into the system by customers.
• Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) to host and execute the
logic of the service, combining components into the
centralised exchange service.
Amazon has been chosen as the cloud provider for all
component services simply for ease of use. They are as-
sumed to be sufficiently trusted as a cloud provider. Docu-
ments, NRO and NRR evidences stored within the service
in the cloud are communicated over encrypted transmission
channels (using public/private key cryptography) meaning
the private key is required to decrypt information obtained
from the exchange service.
Each of the components used to construct the service
can be scaled as needed to cope with increased loads. This
could include provisioning more resources from SQS, SNS
and SimpleDB to cope with more customers, increasing re-
sources from the RelationalDB and Simple Storage services
to deal with more document uploads or spawning additional
message processors by increasing the power of individual
EC2 images, or deploying new ones.
C. Example Document Exchange
The following describes an document exchange between
A and B.
Initially, customers A and B will both spawn their busi-
ness processes, subscribing to their own exchange notifi-
cations from the exchange service. Customer A will then
use document management to upload their document, D,
and their NRO evidence to the exchange service. Upon
completion of the upload, A invokes an exchange with B
for D using exchange management. B receives notification
through its exchange notification subscription that A has
initiated an exchange of D and a digest of NRO to sign
and return (i.e. the NRR) through exchange management.
Upon receiving the signed evidence from B, the exchange
service notifies both A and B the exchange is complete
and allows them access to their respective documents and
evidence through evidence retrieval.
The document upload, exchange invocation, notification
to B, submission of NRR, release of D and NRO and
notification of success to A and B are each achieved by
a single message exchange between the service and client.
While the document upload and exchange were presented
together in this example, they represent the sequential execu-
tion of all three phases as described in section III. Exchanges
cannot be invoked unless a document and its evidence of
origin have been uploaded. If B fails to provide NRR, the
exchange would eventually time out and notify participants
of such.
VII. RELATED WORK
A primary concern when deploying services relating
to trust is, even if the implementation of the document
exchange service is written and verified as correct, what
guarantees are there that the data or computations in the
cloud remain secure? Santos et al. [17] propose a framework
for securing execution of services within the cloud using
a combination of Trusted Platform Modules and existing
trusted computing techniques. Such a framework could
be used to increase confidence in the trustworthiness and
security of a document exchange service based entirely on
cloud technologies.
Specifically relating to business to business agreements
and contracts, Strano [18] has built on previously mentioned
work regarding electronically modelling business contracts
[3]. More recent work provides a vocabulary for modelling
contracts in terms of sets of events, obligations, rights
and prohibitions. These sets contain actions participants
are expected to perform (obligations), allowed to perform
(rights) and prohibited from performing and the events
which allow the sets to transform as interactions progress
(e.g. once a purchase order has been submitted in a single
conversation, another may not be sent). The events used by
this implementation are typically emitted by the business
participants to the contract, making them possibly untrusted.
The exchange service in this paper could be extended to emit
specific events on behalf of customers, making the events
trustworthy, assuming trust in the exchange service itself.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper was to design and implement a
first step in cloud-based fair B2B document exchange and
consider possibilities for constructing such a new service.
To this end it has been successful and has also explored
possibilities for partial leveraging of the cloud to facilitate
migration or address specialised concerns.
The exchange service implemented allows consumers to
upload documents, supports successful exchanges between
correctly behaving participants, supporting timeouts during
the retrieval phase of an exchange and allows any participant
to retrieve all evidence to which they are entitled. The
service does not yet support the aborting of an exchange
in progress or finer grained acquisition of evidence (e.g.
searching or ordering returned evidence).
The exchange service is constructed leveraging cloud
hosted technologies for all aspects. All storage occurs using
automatically scaled services (i.e. SimpleDB, RelationalDB
and Simple Storage Services). The possibility to provision
message based points of interaction per customer allows
fine grained access control to be enforced. Amazon SQS
and SNS state they allow an unlimited number of queues
and topics to be defined per account, meaning scaling to
any number of customers is theoretically supported. The
subsequent aggregation of the incoming queues towards a
single internal worker queue means the number of message
processors dealing with exchanges may be scaled arbitrarily
to cope with workload size. Compared specifically to the
previous JMS and Web Services work, cloud technologies
made aspects including provisioning of per-customer re-
sources and spawning of multiple services much simpler,
which should make the overall system more rapidly and
easily scalable by comparison.
A shortcoming of the implementation arises due to the
handling of an entire exchange by one message processor
node and the lack of failure detection for these nodes. While
the system allows an arbitrary number of message processor
nodes to support multiple exchanges, it means the failure
of any single node results in the failure of all exchanges
associated with that node. The service could be developed to
handle failure more gracefully as all evidence is persistently
stored during the execution of an exchange, failure detection
would need to be integrated into the handling of message
processor nodes and nodes would have to be modified to
automatically recover possible exchanges.
The non-repudiation protocol support is limited to pro-
viding timeouts during the retrieval phase of an exchange,
ideally it also should support timeouts across all phases and
the possibility of aborting an exchange before the point of
no return. Cook et al [4] discuss the protocol constructs,
evidence and constraints regarding aborting non-repudiation
protocol execution.
A. Future Work
Immediate work with regards to the service would include
the use of standards such as XMQP rather than Amazon
SQS for messaging, support for aborting exchanges where
possible and introduction of fault tolerance and exchange
recovery into message processing nodes. Support for addi-
tional non-repudiation protocols within the service would
address possible concerns with revealing information to the
TTPs as discussed in [8].
Further work building on this richer internal support
would involve decentralising the service, and would require
the well-defined inter-service communication formats as
discussed in section V.
Beyond the programmatic API provided, a RESTful in-
terface where all documents, exchanges and evidence are
represented as resources would be desirable. Similar to de-
centralisation this would be contingent upon well-understood
media types. The principles of Hypertext as the Application
Engine of State (HATEOAS) would be particularly applica-
ble to the representation of ongoing exchanges as RESTful
resources. This would be achieved by placing another layer
at the boundary of the service, to deal with the incoming
and outgoing HTTP requests.
Other work involves generalising the exchange service
into a cloud-based, predicated message delivery service. The
service could allow a set of predicates to be defined within
the service (decoupled from the messages themselves).
These predicates could specify conditions about specific
senders, recipients, content types, message contents or events
generated during an exchange. The delivery service would
then be responsible for satisfying these predicates in the
course of correlated business conversations.
Predicated delivery could be combined with Strano’s work
[18], subsuming the contract specification and checking im-
plementation into the exchange service allowing interactions
and exchanges to be driven by electronic contracts.
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